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Not All Incentives Wash Out the Warm Glow:  
The Case of Blood Donation Revisited  
 
 
SUMMARY 
The issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation and the 
perverse effects of financial rewards for blood giving has been recently 
revisited in the economic literature with limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) 
famously pointed out, providing monetary incentives to blood donors may 
crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to 
donate. In this paper we examine how favouring different types of incentives is 
related to the likelihood of donating blood by exploiting a large sample 
representative of the population of fifteen European countries that contains 
information on both donation and attitudes towards incentives. Our results 
show that those who favour monetary rewards for blood donation are less 
likely to be donors and those who favour non-monetary rewards are more 
likely to have donated. This is consistent with the idea that while monetary 
rewards may crowd out blood donation, non-monetary rewards do not. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is increasing interest in the motivation of altruistic behaviour, not merely for the sake of 
exploring behavioural drivers which go beyond classical axioms of self-interest to explain 
individual behaviour, but more recently as a means of correcting government interventions 
which are held to crowd out individual actions. For example, the current UK government has 
advocated the notion of a ‘big society’, which, although rather unclearly defined, appears to have 
altruistic behaviour as a central theme. While there is much loose-talk centred around the 
definition of this policy tool, there is a growing interest in whether such behaviour can be 
motivated through incentive mechanisms. There has thus been interest in nudging behaviour 
towards pre-specified outcomes such as tackling health inequalities, preventing ill-health, 
improving health outcomes and spreading information and good health advice (Department of 
Health, 2011). Possibly one of the most long-lasting and discussed examples of behaviour 
broadly consistent with this notion of core altruistic behaviour is individual blood donation. 
One donated unit of whole blood can save up to three lives but donated blood has a short 
shelf life. Regular donors are therefore essential to secure a constant supply. In 1997, the World 
Health Organization (WHO) recommended that all blood donations should come from unpaid 
voluntary donors. However, by 2006, only 49 of 124 countries surveyed had established this as a 
standard. Furthermore, in the WHO’s European region the number of donors varies from less 
than 4.5 to over 45 per 1000 population. Only 39 per cent of the general population are eligible 
to donate, and fewer than 5 per cent of those eligible actually donate. 
Individuals might undertake certain altruistic actions guided by an intrinsic motivation, 
including a ‘warm-glow’ or moral satisfaction. Blood donation has often been seen as a clear-cut 
example of ‘altruism with non-monetary pay-offs’ (Elster, 1990). Nevertheless, the issue of the 
nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation is yet to be agreed upon in the economic 
literature. Cooper and Culyer (1968) argue that competition and monetary incentives would be 
suitable to motivate donors but Titmuss (1970) famously points out that providing incentives to 
blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to 
donate if a reward is involved. Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) discuss this proposition and 
suggest that the effects of price incentives can simply be added to those of altruistic donation, 
and hence if the price of blood is raised, the quantity offered would increase in accordance with a 
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supply function. However, the question of the effects of monetary incentives on altruistic 
behaviour has remained unanswered and the phenomenon discussed by Titmuss was coined as 
motivation crowd-out. Trying to answer the question of whether altruistic behaviour can be 
incentivised, Frey and Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), and Benabou and Tirole 
(2006) point out that intrinsic motivation may go unnoticed if a payment is offered. 
In this paper, we explore whether financial and non-financial incentives are associated with 
willingness to donate when other observed and unobserved factors are controlled for. We answer 
this question by exploiting a large dataset representative of fifteen European countries containing 
information on both whether or not an individual has been a donor in the past and her 
preferences towards monetary and non-monetary compensation for blood donation. This large 
dataset allows to control for country specific variation, which incorporate country level formal 
(e.g. regulations) and informal (e.g. social norms) heterogeneity. This information allows 
estimation of two recursive equation systems and exploration of the association of preferences 
for different types of rewards (attitudes) and the probability of being a donor.  
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of blood supply crowding out due to monetary 
incentives in all European countries. But, most importantly, we find no evidence of potential 
crowding out when non-monetary rewards are involved in most European countries. These 
results are robust to different specifications and are coherent with the idea that crowding out is a 
phenomenon linked to the introduction of a market based rationale for non-market decisions, and 
that socially motivated individuals remain willing to donate when non-monetary rewards are 
offered. 
Our results confirm and to a certain extent generalise recent findings that monetary and non-
monetary rewards may not crowd out donation (e.g. Goette et al. 2009; Mellstrom and 
Johannesson, 2008; Lacetera and Macis, 2010a, 2010b). The contribution of our present work to 
the extant literature is threefold. First, we use a large dataset representative of fifteen European 
countries containing both attitudes towards incentives for blood donation and past donation 
behaviour as opposed to smaller and/or experimental samples on donors. Second, because of 
that, we can directly analyse the relationship of the respondents’preferences for monetary and 
non-monetary rewards with the probability of being a donor. Further, by using a sample 
representative of fifteen countries, we can control for socio-cultural and institutional variations. 
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Third, our results are consistent with the idea that altruistic behaviour can be incentivised as long 
as the rewards do not conceal the identity of the blood giver as a ‘donor’. 
The next section provides some background on altruism and blood donation; section 3 
describes the data; section 4 describes our econometric model; section 5 discusses the results; 
and section 6 concludes. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
We first present some background on the motivation behind blood donation as an act of gift-
giving and, more specifically, how it relates to different forms of socially motivated acts 
including altruism. We then discuss how the literature on blood donation addresses the question 
of providing incentives for altruistic behaviour. 
1.  Blood Donation and Social Motivation 
Blood donation has been classified as an act of ‘collective gift-giving’ (Mercier Ythier, 2006). 
Donating blood is a pro-social act in the sense that donors incur individual costs in exchange for 
a collective benefit and contributes to ensuring the blood supply system works well. 
In economic terms, blood donation, as any other donation or charitable act, is an economic 
voluntary transfer that traditionally has not been motivated by market exchange. It implies some 
form of economic sacrifice by the giver in exchange for the receivers’ benefit for which the giver 
expects no return. Moreover, since gift-giving individuals, or knights in the terminology of Le 
Grand (1997, 2003), ought to care about the receivers’ utility rather than their own pure self-
interest only, theoretically it is envisaged as an act immune to strategic behaviour of giving 
agents towards the givers (Kolm, 2000). Nevertheless, some forms of altruistic behaviour take 
place partially as a result of a feeling of ‘duty’ towards others (Etzioni, 1988), from the imitation 
of others’ behaviours – especially of those individuals signalled as ‘reference groups’; from a 
feeling of social or moral indebtedness having been or expecting to be on the receiving end on 
another occasion; or, even from identity driven self-interested motivations (e.g. to attain a feeling 
of being a good person) as we argue in this paper. 
Empirically, most blood donors will give some altruistic reason for giving, often citing 
feelings of community attachment or some commitment to the common good as their motive 
(Healy, 2000). The latter paves the way for the development of an identity as an altruist, which 
can be substantiated by a continuous act of blood donation or not. Hence, blood donation can be 
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considered a manifestation of impure altruism, insofar as donors receive a direct moral 
satisfaction for their act beyond that attributable to having contributed to the collective benefit. 
In that sense, Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) examine the type and timing of blood 
donations between new and established donors. They find no evidence that 0-negative donors 
(i.e., the universal blood group compatible with all blood types and hence more valuable for 
donation) donate more, suggesting no evidence of pure altruism. More precisely, in some forms 
of impure altruism such as blood donation agents are said to receive a warm-glow payoff by 
taking an action they believe to be virtuous (Andreoni, 1990). More recently, Stutzer et al. 
(2011) provide evidence form a field experiment with the Swiss red cross suggesting that 
altruistic preferences can be induced by making individuals reflect on the importance of 
contributing to a public good such as blood donation. 
2.  Blood Donation and Incentives 
In his famous work, Titmuss (1971) reported evidence that nonmarket mechanisms for blood 
donation are not only ethically superior but also more efficient. Indeed, according to Titmuss, 
hepatitis rates from blood transfusions significantly decreased when the blood was donated rather 
than purchased. This was explained by the fact that donors who are not paid for blood have no 
incentive to hide an illness, which leads to a higher quality of blood in such systems. Moreover, a 
financial reimbursement for blood donation could induce those who are more ‘in need’ of money 
to oversupply, eliciting a ‘new supply’ from non-altruistic individuals, who are in turn likely to 
be less healthy. Reimbursement for blood would reduce the altruistic motivations behind 
individuals’ blood donation behaviour, producing a decline in supply from those individuals, i.e. 
crowd-out. As mentioned, this seminal work prompted Arrow’s (1972) and Solow’s (1971) 
responses questioning the substitution of altruists by non-altruists in line with Cooper and 
Culyer’s (1968) arguments. Kessel (1974) added that market mechanisms could provide 
guarantees for blood quality if accompanied by screening techniques to ensure product 
accountability. Interestingly, Thorne (2000) argued that with more effective exhortation, a donor 
system is capable of procuring more organs at lower costs than market procurement. More 
recently, Andreoni et al. (2008, p. 134) argued that ‘having a personal identity as an altruist 
might necessarily precede altruistic acts’ and that the use of monetary rewards would conflict 
with such identity and hence have unintended effect on individuals’ altruistic motivations.’ 
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It is worth mentioning, albeit briefly, that a string of theoretical papers discussing signalling 
models and crowding out have also touched upon the subject of donation. These papers discuss 
how individuals engage in civic activities to signal altruism. The introduction of monetary 
incentives may make signalling more difficult and thus cause crowding out (Seabright, 2004; 
Benabou and Tirole, 2006). Also, there exists some literature about the counter-productivity of 
monetary incentives in diverse settings (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b; Fehr and Falk, 
2002; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Drawing on Benabou and Tirole (2006), Ariely et al. (2009) 
model image motivation or the desire to be liked and well-regarded by others as a driver in 
prosocial behavior and analyse whether extrinsic monetary incentives have a detrimental effect 
on prosocial behavior due to the crowding out of image. They show and test this with an 
experiment that monetary incentives crowd out image motivation. 
Empirical papers relating incentives and blood donation are summarised in the 
comprehensive reviews by Goette et al. (2010) and Kamenica (2012). Goette et al. (2010) 
conclude that incentives had no negative effects on blood donation in studies in which 
participants were adequately randomised and faced anonymised settings, providing no support 
for the motivational crowding out. Their analysis of the literature on whether incentives lead to 
increased blood donation concludes that results are so far mixed. Further, although some 
experiments suggest that concerns for one’s image in public settings may create pro-social 
behavior, these authors point out that there is some controversial evidence on this result also.  
In an illustrative example of the existing related literature on the effect of incentives on blood 
donation we have Mellstrom and Joannesson (2008) test Titmuss’ proposition using a field 
experiment with three groups of individuals. Those that are offered money if they donate blood, 
those who are offered the possibility of donating the money directly to a charity, and those who 
are offered no compensation at all. They find that for men willingness to donate is not impacted 
by the treatment group they belong to, but monetary compensation crowds out potential female 
blood donors. Importantly, when charitable motivation is introduced, crowding out disappears. 
Glynn et al. (2003) surveyed 45,588 US blood donors on their attitudes towards incentives for 
blood donation. They found that giving blood credits, cholesterol screening and prostate-specific 
antigen screening encouraged donation and that 7 to 9 per cent of donors reported that 
compensatory incentives would have the opposite effect. In contrast, in a field experiment using 
more than 10,000 previous donors, Goette and Stutzer (2008) find that offering cholesterol tests 
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had no significant effect on donations. Offering lottery tickets instead did increase the turnout at 
blood drives among infrequent donors, but there were no effects among frequent donors. Further, 
in another field experiment on non-donors and previous donors, Goette et al. (2009) find that 
free cholesterol testing does not impact positively donations from neither group. Lacetera and 
Macis (2010a) exploit a longitudinal dataset on all donors in one town and find that publicly 
announcing symbolic prizes for donors achieving certain quotas encouraged frequency of 
donation. Their results suggest that in this setting social image concerns may promote prosocial 
behaviour. Lacetera and Macis (2010b) use a subsample of that population to answer a survey on 
attitudes towards different types of compensation. They find that whilst cash payments would 
reduce donations especially among women and older donors, an equivalent amount in the form 
of vouchers would not. Lacetera and Macis (2013) find that granting a one-day paid leave of 
absence to blood donors in Italy resulted in one extra donation per year (a 40% relative increase) 
and that , interestingly, this positive effect was persistent beyond the period beyond the end of 
the legislative change. Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2011, 2012) further prove that monetary 
incentives may enhance the quantity of blood donations through field experiments using a 
American Red Cross drives. Lastly, Wildman and Hollingsworth (2009) examine the type and 
timing of blood donations between new and established donors and find a systematic difference 
between the two groups. Whilst new donors are sensitive to incentives, established donors’ 
behaviour is driven primarily by social norms. 
In general, most of the empirical studies suggest that crowding out is specific of the 
particular settings individuals are in. We advocate that extrinsic motivation or rewards for blood 
donation may take different meanings within each country’s different social norms, and hence 
we should expect differential levels of crowding out by country. Furthermore, in line with the 
literature, we expect that not all rewards may crowd out an individual’s identity as an altruist (or 
a donor) and that the response to different types of rewards will vary by country also. 
For the purpose of motivating our empirical specification, we conclude this section by 
suggesting that the effect of monetary incentives on blood supply can be modeled by drawing on 
the concept of donor identity. Assume that blood donated enters an individual’s utility function, 
U(⋅), by two means: positively through the (warm glow) effect that it has on her self-image or 
self-identity I(⋅) as a donor, a gift-giver or an altruist, and negatively as a direct consequence of 
the inconveniences associated with donating blood. Also, monetary incentives for blood 
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donation, r(a), increase the income of the donor but affect negatively the donor’s self-image or 
self-identity          . The individual maximizes utility: 
              (1) 
such that self-image I is 
                 (2) 
subject to the budget constraint 
            (3) 
where a is the intensity of blood donation, c is a composite commodity with price p, I is self-
identity, D is a vector containing individual demographic characteristics and the individual social 
environment, E represents other environmental factors which include social norms, v is wealth of 
the individual, and r(a) is the monetary incentive given for blood donation. The (rearranged) 
first-order condition for the maximisation problem of this simplified image caring individual - 
and the expected sign of each partial derivative is  
 
0)( 

   rIIUaraIIUaU  (4) 
                                       
                                  
Assuming concavity of utility function with respect to a, the first-order condition above 
illustrates how a negative effect on self-identity from receiving a monetary reward for blood 
donation will decrease the optimal amount of donation,   . The reason is that without the 
negative effect of monetary rewards for donation on self-identity, i.e.                 , the 
optimal amount of blood supply    satisfies                                 . But if                0, then the associated optimum,    , satisfies the first order condition in (4) 
instead, i.e. at    ,                                                        . 
This implies that  the function                              has a positive gradient 
evaluated at     . Thus,     lies to the left of the original optimum    , i.e., it is smaller.  
In the case that the rewards to blood donation are not monetary,  ̃    and the utility function 
depends positively on them,      ̃     , the effect on blood donation is ambiguous as the 
associated first-order condition is                             ̃  ̃         , and thus 
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the comparison between      and    will depend on the relative magnitudes of            and       ̃  ̃       , which we cannot establish a priori. 
In the next section, we describe our dataset and later we explain our empirical approach to 
test whether monetary and nonmonetary incentives are negatively associated with blood 
donation. 
 
III.  DATA AND SAMPLE 
We use data from the 2002 Eurobarometer (58.2), a survey covering fifteen European countries: 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The survey contains 
information on socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, and health and attitudes 
towards risk. In particular, among other subjects, this issue of the Eurobarometer survey gathered 
information not only on blood donation but also on the respondents’ views on blood and organ 
donation. We use the answers to the following questions: 
The first question (Q59) is on blood donation and it is phrased as ‘Have you donated in the 
past? ’ This question can be answered with a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The second question (Q60), on 
attitudes towards rewards for blood donation, asks ‘In your opinion, should someone who gives 
blood ...? ’ The possible answers were: 
• receive a fixed fee of: 
– 10 Euros (Yes/No) 
– 25 Euros (Yes/No) 
– 100 Euros (Yes/No).  
• be allowed to do so during working hours (Yes/No) 
• be reimbursed for the expenses incurred (Yes/No) 
• receive a small non-monetary gift (Yes/No)1 
                                                                
1
 Unfortunately, the nature of the small gift is not precisely specified in the questionnaire or 
the codebook. We assume that a small gift in most European countries is understood to be a 
symbolic present such as a pen, a notebook, a mug, a badge, etc. commonly given during 
such blood drives. 
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• not receive anything (Yes/No)  
As reported in Table 1, about 35 per cent of our sample of 8,821 European individuals have 
donated blood. Looking at the blood donors column, we observe that 86 per cent of donors do 
not think donors should be rewarded with a monetary compensation, while fourteen per cent 
believe they should. Eighty-two per cent of the non-donors think money should not be provided 
for blood donation and eighteen per cent believe it should. These percentages are all significantly 
different at the five per cent level. 
In Figure 1 we plot the percentages of donors and non-donors who believe that €10, €25, and 
€100 should be given for blood donation. The graph shows negatively sloped offer curves for 
both donors and non-donors, i.e., the higher the price offered, the less people chose it as the right 
answer. Most significantly, the non-donors’ curve appears to the right of that for the donors. 
Table 2 displays a further summary of responses to these key questions by the respondents’ 
socio-demographic characteristics and by their choices with regards to monetary versus non-
monetary rewards. We notice from column one that more males have donated blood than females 
have (forty-one versus thirty per cent). Also, those living in Nordic European countries are more 
likely to have given blood than those in Central Europe (thirty-six per cent versus thirty-five per 
cent), the latter being more likely to have donated blood than the Mediterranean countries (thirty-
four per cent). The second group of columns shows that eighteen per cent of the male 
respondents believe that monetary rewards should be given to donors and their reservation price 
(average amount) is €30.06. Sixteen per cent of females believe money should be offered and the 
average amount is very similar (€29.06). The regional differences in this table are remarkable. 
Although the Mediterranean countries have a similar percentage of donors to those of North and 
Central Europe (34 to 36 per cent), fewer Mediterranean individuals are in favour of monetary 
rewards for blood donation (six per cent as opposed to fifteen and twenty-five per cent), but on 
average they choose higher monetary rewards for donation – with an average of €52.77 as 
opposed to €23.78 and €28.29, respectively. These regional differences with respect to attitudes 
towards rewards could be explained by the levels of income per capita and/or the levels of social 
capital and trust in the institutions, although a more refined multivariate analysis is required to 
explore the differences behind these bivariate frequencies. 
Finally, in the last column we report the percentages of those choosing non-monetary 
rewards for blood donation: sixty-seven per cent of males agree with a non-monetary reward, 
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while sixty-nine per cent of females do so. The percentages of Mediterranean, Nordic and 
Central European respondents who choose non-monetary rewards are sixty, seventy-eight and 
sixty-six, respectively. The row at the bottom of Table 2 summarizes the information broken 
down above for the aggregate, i.e., thirty-five per cent of the sample has donated blood, the 
average reward for the seventeen per cent favouring monetary rewards is €29.55, and 68 per cent 
of the full sample are in favour of non-monetary rewards. 
Table 3 presents definitions and sample statistics of the variables used in the empirical 
analysis. Besides, the table includes two key variables: The percentages of the sample who 
considered that blood transfusion ‘less’, ‘as’ or ‘more’ safe in 2002 than in 1992 (14, 20 and 66 
per cent, respectively) as this may be an important determinant of the decision to donate blood. 
And, the answer to the question on ‘how much concern others show towards oneself’ because we 
believe it may capture how much solidarity the respondent perceives in her/his environment, and 
that could influence altruistic tendencies. Five per cent of our sample felt other people do not 
show concern about what they are doing, fourteen per cent thought other people show little 
concern, forty-seven per cent felt that other people show some concern, and thirty-four per cent 
declared others showed a lot of concern. 
In the next section, we describe our empirical approach to addressing the questions of 
interest. 
IV. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY: A RECURSIVE EQUATION 
SYSTEM 
Our empirical approach relies on two hypotheses. First, there are unobserved individual 
characteristics such as altruism and family history that influence both the decision of donating 
blood and the views on rewarding blood donation. Thus, the error terms of equations trying to 
explain having donated blood and beliefs towards rewarding blood donation with money or other 
rewards will be correlated. Second, beyond that unobserved correlation, individual preferences 
towards rewards for blood donation may have a direct influence on the likelihood of having 
donated blood but not vice versa .2 Accordingly, to answer the question of whether being in 
                                                                
2
 We also estimated two alternative specifications: one in which donation is allowed to affect 
the likelihood of favouring rewards (monetary and non-monetary) but not vice versa, and a 
‘simultaneous equation system’ (SEQ) in which the attitude toward favoring rewards is 
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favour of  monetary/non-monetary rewards is related to having donated blood, we estimate two 
recursive systems: one for donation and monetary reward, and the other for donation and other 
reward. In each case, the equation explaining donation depends on attitudes towards the type of 
reward analysed, but the equation explaining attitudes towards the reward does not depend on 
being a donor. 
Thus, the system for binary blood donation      and binary reward      is characterized by 
the structural equations for the corresponding latent variables (    and    ): 
                        (5) 
                   (6) 
In equations (5) and (6), the error terms          are assumed to be distributed as bivariate 
normal with zero means, unitary variances, and correlation –1 ≤ ρ ≤ 1; the variances are assumed 
to be unitary because observed outcomes for     and    are both binary. 
Vectors       and    are observed individual traits such that   affects both blood donation 
and reward,    determines donation only, and    determines reward only; together, these 
variables constitute the individual demographics (D) and environmental factors (E) which enter 
the utility function (equations (1) and (2)). 
The reduced form equation system constitutes equation (6) and 
                                   (7) 
where the composite error term           , and the error vector           is distributed3 as 
bivariate normal with zero means, finite variances          and correlation           , 
where             . Based on the reduced form equations (7) and (6), binary donation 
and reward are characterized by 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                              
allowed to affect donation as well. The effect of donation (on reward) is found to be 
statistically insignificant in both cases. Further, estimation of the SEQ produces few 
discernible differences in the effects of exogenous variables. These results offer empirical 
support for our specification of a recursive system. 
3
 Note that by specifying a distribution for the error terms of the structural equations (5) and 
(6), rather than for the error terms of the reduced forms (7) and (6) as in Maddala (1983, p. 
246), the composite error term     depends on error terms (   and   ) of both structural 
equations, leading to a covariance structure which accommodates heterogeneity in the 
reduced form in equation (7) for donation. 
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      if        
 0  if             (8) 
 
To allow for the fact that countries from different regions may have very different ethnic, 
cultural and social backgrounds, different levels of social capital and trust in the institutions, as 
well as blood collection habits and infrastructures, we also estimate a model in which country 
dummy variables are interacted with latent reward     in equation (5). This amounts to making 
the coefficient γ of the latent reward a function of regional dummy variables d with parameter 
vector δ: 
       (9) 
To simplify notations, express the deterministic components on the right-hand sides of the 
reduced forms (7) and (6) as      and     , respectively, where                 is the 
concatenated variable vector and    and    are conformable parameter vectors which are 
functions of the structural parameters in equations (5) and (6). Then, the sample likelihood 
function is similar to that of a bivariate probit model:   ∏           ⁄                   (10) 
where          and          are dichotomous indicators,   is the standard bivariate 
normal cumulative distribution function, and ‘all’ indicates multiplication over all sample 
observations. 
1.  Identification Strategy 
Unique variables    in the donation equation (5) and    in the reward equation (6) serve to 
identify the model parameters (also see (7)). 
Common explanatory variables for both processes (x) are age, gender, education, marital 
status and country of origin. As variables that explain the donation decision but not beliefs about 
rewards for blood donation     , we include those related to individual health (self assessed 
health, having a long standing illness, exercise), the type of dwelling where the respondent lives 
− as it may reflect accessibility to blood donation infrastructure; whether the individual perceives 
donation to be safer or not than ten years ago; and whether or not the respondent feels concern 
from others - possibly capturing the individual’s perceived level of others’ altruism. As variables 
13 
 
explaining beliefs towards monetary and non-monetary rewards for donation but not the donation 
decision per se      we have included the income of the individual and whether he is employed, 
self-employed or out of work. As noted below, the use of    in the donation equation and    in 
the reward equation are justified by Wald tests for their joint significance. 
We present the results in the next section and discuss them in the following section. 
V. RESULTS 
We first present estimates of the ‘having donated blood’ equation. Secondly, we provide country 
specific estimates of the coefficient associated with being in favour of monetary rewards and of 
non-monetary rewards. 
Table 4 presents results for the recursive systems of having been a donor, and being in favour 
of monetary rewards and non-monetary rewards for blood donation, respectively. The top panel 
contains estimates for the system in which being in favour of monetary rewards is considered. 
The bottom panel presents the results for being in favour of a non-monetary rewards system. The 
first column in each specification reports estimates for the donation equation and the second 
column for the reward equation. We present the results starting with the most parsimonious 
specification and move on to specifications with an increasing number of controls. This is done 
to illustrate the robustness of the main coefficients of interest. 
For both models, when estimating the probability of having donated, the first specification 
controls for self-assessed health, having a chronic illness, and gender; the second specification 
adds age and level of education; the third includes marital status and the level of urbanisation 
(rural, village, urban). The fourth specification additionally controls for country of origin and, 
finally, ‘model e’ adds to that the level of physical activity and the individual’s perceived 
solidarity towards oneself, viz., perceived degree of concern from others. When estimating the 
likelihood of being in favour of a particular type of reward for blood donation, the first 
specification controls for gender and income; the second incorporates employment status, age 
and education; the third adds marital status; and the fourth and fifth additionally control for 
country of origin. In sum, in the benchmark specification, the blood donation equation 
identifying variables,   , are those related to health, physical activity, belief that blood donation 
is safer, type of dwelling, and perceived concern from others. The variables that identify the 
rewards equation,   , are income and employment status. 
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On favouring monetary rewards for donation, the top row of the top panel contains the 
coefficients associated with being in favour of monetary rewards in the equation explaining the 
probability of having donated blood for the different specifications. The coefficient is −0.593 and 
significant at the 95 per cent level of confidence for the first and most parsimonious 
specification. This coefficient becomes −0.784 and significant at the 99 per cent level of 
confidence in the second specification and remains very close in magnitude to those in 
subsequent specifications (i.e., taking values −0.793, −0.760 and −0.762). This coefficient is 
robust to different specifications and thus establishes the negative association between being in 
favour of monetary rewards for blood donation and the likelihood of having donated blood hints 
at the crowding out effect of paying for blood donation. That is, donors are less likely to favour 
monetary compensation for donation than non-donors. 
The bottom panel of Table 4 contains estimates for the donation-non-monetary system. The 
first row shows the coefficients associated with believing that non-monetary rewards for blood 
donation should be provided in the equation explaining the probability of having donated blood 
in the different specifications (from left to right). The coefficient is 0.052 and insignificant for 
the first specification; it remains insignificant and around 0.05 for the next two specifications, 
which do not control for countries of origin. When countries of origin are incorporated in the 
fourth and fifth specifications, the coefficient becomes about 0.3 and significant at the 95 per 
cent level of confidence. Although this coefficient is not as robust as that associated with 
believing in monetary rewards, these estimates suggest that those in favour of non-monetary 
rewards are less likely to have donated blood. The estimates for our benchmark (last) model can 
be found in Table 5. We briefly summarize the most interesting and significant results. Looking 
at the estimates for the recursive system of donation and monetary rewards in Table 5, we notice 
that, the use of the aforementioned identification variables are justified by their joint significance 
in the donation equation (Wald = 20.43, df = 12, p-value = 0.059) and money reward equation 
(Wald = 15.61, df = 3, p-value = 0.003). In addition, as expected, believing that donating blood 
is much safer than before is associated with a higher likelihood of donation, as are age, education 
level, gender (being male) and, surprisingly, widowhood. The positive coefficient of being male 
may be explained by physical reasons, viz., donors have to be above a certain body weight, and 
pregnancy, breast-feeding and anemia are not conducive to blood donation. With respect to the 
likelihood of favouring monetary rewards, we observe that being employed and self-employed 
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(as opposed to unemployed) have a negative effect, as do age and being divorced. Income, 
having been in the education system until 20 years of age, and being male have a positive 
coefficient. 
For the recursive system of donation and non-monetary rewards indicate that, the use of the 
identification variables are again justified by their joint significance in the donation equation 
(Wald = 33.51, df = 12, p-value = 0.001) and reward equation (Wald = 31.98, df = 3, p-value < 
0.001). Results also suggest that again, being male, belief that blood donation has become safer, 
age, and education also have positive impacts on the donation equation, while widowhood is now 
negatively correlated with donation. With respect to the likelihood of favouring non-monetary 
rewards, we find that being employed has a positive coefficient while being self-employed and 
being a widow have negative effects. 
Controlling for countries of origin has an important effect on the coefficients of interest. This 
is expected because of the different country-specific traditions and infrastructures for collecting 
blood, mix of ethnicities and cultures, and levels of social capital. For that reason, we estimate a 
modification of the benchmark model above by interacting latent rewards with country dummy 
variables, as described in (9). Table 6 displays these results. The most remarkable conclusion 
from the country analysis is that all countries show a similar and significant negative association 
between believing in monetary rewards and donation (except for Austria that has a larger 
negative coefficient), and thus, monetary rewards for blood donation could potentially mean a 
crowd out of blood supply of similar magnitudes. The second notable finding is that, when using 
this modified specification, the coefficient of non-monetary rewards is not everywhere positive. 
Only Austria shows a positive coefficient of 0.348, which is significant at the 99 percent 
confidence level. For Italy and Sweden, the coefficient is negative although only significant at 
the 90 percent confidence level; and, for the remaining countries the association is not 
significant. The no significance of these country-interaction coefficients is somehow puzzling 
vis-à-vis the significant positive coefficient obtained with the benchmark specification which 
controlled for country-level variation. In reality, some sort of non-monetary incentives are 
reportedly given already in most countries except for Finland, Slovenia, Spain, Serbia and United 
Kingdom. For instance, in the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, Romania, Croatia and 
possibly France, blood donation has been often incentivised using days off work, tax reliefs or 
other material gifts (Abolghasemi et al., 2010). Thus, the heterogeneity of non-monetary rewards 
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already in place could be influencing the country-specific responses to the question. But, the 
heterogeneous preferences across countries are only crudely captured by our analysis and there 
may be a myriad of attitudes and institutional differences underlying these preferences that we 
cannot disentangle and only more precise country level data would allow to fully understand.  
In the next section we discuss these results and conclude. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This paper analyses the question of whether offering monetary rewards for blood donation might 
crowd out blood supply, as well as whether non-monetary rewards would have the same effect. 
We examine these questions drawing on a large survey representative of individuals in fifteen 
European countries containing individual information on blood donation and preferences for 
monetary and non-monetary rewards for blood donation. Our results indicate that those who 
believe that monetary rewards should be given for blood donation are less likely to have donated 
blood, while those favouring non-monetary rewards instead are equally or more likely to have 
donated blood. 
Although our data do not contain information on individual intensity of donations, we 
interpret the negative association between favouring monetary rewards and the actual donation of 
blood as indicative of the negative effect of cash for blood on the altruistic individual’s identity. 
Using a stylised theoretical model, we show that a negative effect of monetary rewards on the 
altruistic individual’s identity could result in less intensity of donations but non-monetary results 
would not necessarily lead to this outcome. Thus, our results suggest that offering monetary 
rewards for blood donation might indeed crowd out blood supply since the altruistic individual 
does not favour monetary rewards. Our results also indicate, however, that there would be no 
supply displacement of altruistic donors if non-monetary rewards were offered instead. Thus, 
non-monetary rewards could potentially be used to incentivise blood donation as this kind of 
rewards seems not to remove, in the terminology of Andreoni et al. (2008), the warm-glow 
associated with blood giving. Our findings contribute interestingly to the existing body of 
literature using experimental results of Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) and Lacetera and 
Macis (2010b); and Lacetera, Macis and Slonim (2011, 2012); Lacetera and Macis (2010a, 
2013); and Glynn et al. (2003) using donors’ datasets. Our analysis further confirms their 
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findings by providing additional empirical evidence obtained using information on the 
preferences of both donors and non-donors. 
We also find strong evidence of gender differences. First of all, males are more likely to be 
donors, more likely to favour monetary rewards, but not more likely to be in favour of non-
monetary rewards. As noted earlier, males may be more likely to be donors for physical reasons 
(e.g., higher body weight, absence of pregnancy and lactation period, and lower likelihood of 
being anemic). Other explanations include the fact that some countries organise blood drives to 
factories and other places with a higher percentage of males – and even motivate very strongly 
those in the military service to give blood as is the case in Austria.4 
Another remarkable finding of this paper is that although we confirm that country of origin is 
a very significant source of variation, a more detailed analysis at the country level reveals that 
the association of favouring monetary rewards and blood donation is uniformly negative and 
very significant across all countries. Nevertheless, the country coefficient for the association 
between non-monetary rewards and blood donation is much more heterogeneous, with Austria 
showing a strongly positive and significant sign but Italy and Sweden showing the opposite.  
While this paper presents one of the first attempts at investigating the crowding out issue 
using large multi-country survey data from Europe containing not only observational data but 
also attitudinal information on donors and non-donors, a few caveats pertain. First, our data 
come from a cross sectional database which, while large and representative of fifteen European 
countries, imposes important restrictions on the interpretation of the results. Also, the definition 
of a donor in the data is very wide one and includes any person that has ever donated blood. 
Therefore, we can suitably measure donor identity but not intensity of blood donation as we 
cannot distinguish regular from non-regular donors. Further, our analysis seeks to establish 
associations between individual information related to ‘beliefs’ (being in favour of a type of 
reward for blood donation) with an ‘act realisation’ (having donated blood). The hypothetical 
nature of the stated ‘beliefs’ may therefore weaken the argument we are trying to make and the 
slightly judgmental nature of the question used during the survey (‘should someone who gives 
blood receive...’) may have further aggravated this problem. Additionally, having obtained the 
data using a survey, individual responses may be biased because of the wish to ‘look good’, and 
                                                                
4
 In Austria there is an agreement between the army and the Red Cross. The army motivates 
blood donation by allowing donors to leave for the weekend earlier on the Friday after blood 
donation and the Red Cross provides the blood group test for free (Fiala, 1997). 
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this type of bias could have possibly even contaminate the declared donors’ answers to the 
question on monetary rewards. Finally, we choose to allow favouring of rewards to have a direct 
association with being a donor but not vice versa . While bad experiences donating blood could 
affect beliefs about rewarding for blood donation (to compensate for pain, for instance), this 
seems implausible and statistical test during our preliminary analysis did not support the reverse 
causality of donation on beliefs (see footnote 2). 
Our results suggest that altruistic actions may be incentivised as long as the incentives do not 
interfere with the self-identity/image of the individual as a donor. Thus, to deal with blood 
shortages, policies geared towards the provision of non-monetary incentives could be 
implemented. This is compatible with the notion of nudging behaviour to fulfill a wider social 
policy objective. That is, altruistic behaviour could be motivated by non-monetary means and 
thus nudge individuals to act in a manner that provides collective benefit. 
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Table 1  
 Frequency of Preferences Towards Rewards 
 Donors        Non-donors Full sample 
 35% 65% 100% 
Monetary reward    
 No 86% 82% 83% 
  Yes 14% 18% 17% 
Other reward    
 No 33% 32% 32% 
 Yes 67% 68% 68% 
 Note: All differences are significant at the 5% significance level.
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Table 2  
 Donation and Reward by Gender and Geographic Area  
 % that Monetary reward Non-monetary 
 have donated  Mean amount among reward: 
 blood % favouring those favouring (€) % favouring (€) 
Gender     
 Male 41.30 17.52 30.06 67.22 
   (30.51)  
 Female 29.63 15.83 29.06 68.53 
   (30.61)  
Area     
 Mediterranean 33.71 6.05 52.77 59.69 
   (41.72)  
 Nordic 36.07 15.43 23.78 77.97 
   (25.08)  
 Central Europe 35.26 25.37 28.29 65.90 
   (28.82)  
 Full sample 35.06 16.62 29.55 67.92 
   (30.56)  
 Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
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Table 3  
 Definitions and Sample Statistics of Explanatory Variables 
Variable Definition Mean 
Continuous explanatory variables 
Age Age in years 45.72 
  (17.28) 
Income Total wages and salaries per month, including 13971.40 
 pensions, child benefits, and other rents (3315.13) 
Vigorous activity Vigorous physical activity (minutes/week) 101.91 
  (173.56) 
 Among those who exercise vigorously (39.59% 257.42 
 of sample) (189.91) 
Binary explanatory variables (yes =  1; no =  0) 
Male Gender is male 0.47 
Education   
 Education 1 Finished full-time education when age < 15 (ref.) 0.24 
 Education 2 Finished full-time education when 16 ≤ age ≤19 0.38 
 Education 3 Finished full-time education when age ≥20 0.29 
 Education 4 Still studying 0.08 
Marital status   
   Unmarried Unmarried or separated (ref.) 0.31 
 Married Married 0.52 
 Divorced Divorced 0.09 
   Widowed Widowed 0.08 
Dwelling   
 Village Living in rural area or village 0.34 
 Town Living in small or middle-sized town 0.34 
   City Living in large town (ref.) 0.32 
Employment   
  Employed Currently employed 0.47 
 Self-employed Currently self-employed 0.07 
  Not working Currently not working (ref.) 0.46 
Self-assessed health   
 Health very bad Self-assessed health (SAH) is very bad or bad (ref.) 0.06 
 Health fair SAH is fair 0.25 
   Health good SAH is good 0.43 
   Health very good SAH is very good 0.26 
Standing illness Suffering from long-standing illness 0.29 
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Safety in blood donation 
   Less safe Blood transfusion less safe than 10 years ago (ref.) 0.14 
   As safe Blood transfusion as safe as 10 years ago 0.20 
   Safer Blood transfusion safer than 10 years ago 0.66 
Concern from others 
   No concern Receive no concern (from others) 0.05 
   Little concern Receive little concern 0.14 
   Some concern Receive some concern 0.47 
   Lots of concern Receive lots of concern 0.34 
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. For households who did not respond to the income 
question, we imputed income based on age, sex, marital status, education, health and number of 
members in the family. The term (ref.) indicates that that category has been used as reference in 
the estimation (omitted category). For the ease of interpretation later on, the variables ‘Age’ and 
‘Vigorous Activity’ were rescaled by dividing them by 100, and the variable ‘Income’ was 
divided by 1000 during the estimation process. 
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Table 4 
Simultaneous Equation Model of Donation and Beliefs towards Rewards (Pooled Sample) 
 Model a Model b Model c Model d Model e 
 Donate 
Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate 
Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate 
Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate 
Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate 
Monetary 
Rewards  
Variable 
 Coeff          S.E.    Coeff         S.E.   Coeff         S.E.    Coeff         S.E. Coeff         S.E.    Coeff         S.E.  Coeff         S.E.    Coeff         S.E. Coeff        S.E.   Coeff         S.E. 
Reward –0.593 (0.295)** 
 
–0.784 (0.092)*** 
 
–0.793 (0.087)*** 
 
–0.760 (0.120)*** 
 
–0.762 (0.119)***  
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Health YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Chronic illness YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Physical activity         YES  
Safety         YES  
Income  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Employment status    YES  YES  YES  YES 
Gender YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Education   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Marital status     YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dwelling     YES  YES  YES  
Perceived solidarity         YES  
Control countries  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Error corr.(rho) 
 
0.489 (0.316)  0.704 (0.103)***  0.712 (0.099)***  0.654 (0.136)***  0.658 (0.135)*** 
 Model a Model b Model c Model d Model e 
 Donate Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate Monetary 
Rewards 
Donate Monetary 
Rewards  
Variable 
 Coeff          S.E.    Coeff         S.E.   Coeff         S.E.    Coeff         S.E. Coeff         S.E.    Coeff         S.E.  Coeff         S.E.    Coeff         S.E. Coeff        S.E.   Coeff         S.E. 
Reward 0.052 (9.940)  0.048 (0.125)  0.056 (0.128)  0.322 (0.149)**  0.352 (0.151)**  
Constant YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Health YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Chronic illness YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  
Physical activity         YES  
Safety         YES  
Income  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Employment status    YES  YES  YES  YES 
Gender YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Education   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Marital status     YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Dwelling     YES  YES  YES  
Perceived solidarity         YES  
Control countries  NO  NO  NO  YES  YES 
Error corr.(rho)  –0.060 (9.936)  –0.068 (0.126)  –0.075 (0.129)  –0.332 (0.149)**  –0.363 (0.151)** 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses. Significance at 1% is indicated with ***, at 5% with ** and at 10% with *.
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Table 5 
Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Recursive Equation Systems 
 
Monetary 
 
Non-monetary 
Variable Donation Reward 
 
Donation Reward 
Reward –0.762 (0.119)*** 
  
0.352 (0.151)*** 
 Health fair –0.058 (0.051) 
  
–0.052 (0.062) 
 
Health good –0.017 (0.053) 
  
0.0007 (0.065) 
 
Health very good 0.017 (0.057) 
  
0.043 (0.070) 
 
Vigorous activity 0.010 (0.007) 
  
0.013 (0.008) 
 Standing illness 0.002 (0.029) 
  
–0.013 (0.035) 
 
As safe 0.002 (0.039) 
  
0.025 (0.048) 
 
Safer 0.125 (0.039)*** 
  
0.170 (0.043)*** 
 
Income / 1000 
 
0.009 (0.005)* 
  
0.0001 (0.006) 
Employed 
 
–0.180 (0.046)*** 
  
0.159 (0.037)*** 
Self-employed 
 
–0.198 (0.065)*** 
  
–0.114 (0.061)* 
Male 0.363 (0.041)*** 0.178 (0.038)*** 
 
0.301 (0.032)*** –0.043 (0.030) 
Age / 10 0.042 (0.117)** –0.038 (0.016)* 
 
0.090 (0.012)*** –0.0004 (0.013) 
Education 2 0.363 (0.041)*** 0.178 (0.038)*** 
 
0.272 (0.044)*** –0.012 (0.041) 
Education 3 0.175(0.060)*** –0.024(0.053)  0.357(0.052)*** 0.006(0.045) 
Education 4 0.251(0.073)*** –0.023(0.057)  –0.032(0.084) –0.106(0.075) 
Married –0.043(0.090) –0.026(0.092)  0.004(0.038) –0.037(0.038) 
Divorced –0.034(0.049) –0.102(0.048)**  –0.002(0.057) 0.002(0.059) 
Widowed 0.148(0.071)** –0.006(0.071)  –0.155(0.077)** –0.124(0.071)* 
Village –0.054(0.030)*   –0.030(0.035)  
Town –0.031(0.029)   –0.018(0.034)  
Little concern –0.061(0.057)   –0.074(0.069)  
Some concern –0.056(0.052)   –0.061(0.063)  
Lots of concern –0.048(0.053)   –0.049(0.065)  
Constant –1.780(0.141)*** –1.341(0.128)***  –1.236(0.142)*** 0.668(0.116)*** 
Countries Yes   Yes  
Error corr. (ρ) 0.658(0.135)***   –0.363(0.151)  
Log likelihood –8602.400   –10620.789  
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate level of significance: *** = 1%, ** 
= 5%, * = 10%. 
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Table 6  
Country-Specific Association Between Rewards and Donation 
 
Monetary Non-monetary 
Greece −0.907 (0.086)*** −0.019 (0.131) 
Belgium −0.619 (0.132)*** −0.155 (0.142) 
Denmark −0.835 (0.097)*** −0.008 (0.122) 
W. Germany −0.791 (0.100)*** 0.004 (0.131) 
Italy −0.598 (0.131)*** −0.244 (0.143)* 
Spain −0.782 (0.104)*** 0.051 (0.138) 
France −0.893 (0.084)*** 0.053 (0.128) 
Ireland −0.907 (0.090)*** −0.003 (0.143) 
N. Ireland −0.931 (0.098)*** 0.160 (0.156) 
Luxembourg −0.679 (0.126)*** −0.114 (0.139) 
Netherlands −0.676 (0.121)*** −0.195 (0.132) 
Portugal −0.726 (0.119)*** −0.101 (0.134) 
Britain −0.839 (0.090)*** 0.130 (0.137) 
E. Germany −0.740 (0.112)*** 0.061 (0.130) 
Finland −0.878 (0.087)*** 0.082 (0.126) 
Sweden −0.700 (0.118)*** −0.234 (0.123)* 
Austria −1.175 (0.058)*** 0.348 (0.132)*** 
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks indicate level of significance: 
*** = 1%, ** = 5%, * = 10%. 
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